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"In August 1983, I was recalled to Nigeria from Harare and posted to the Directorate of Support Command, a position equivalent to the second in command to the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). The Director, Brigadier Aliyu Mohammed, had insisted that I should be recalled to stand in while he was going away to the famous Kimberley Staff College, London, UK in 1984 having been unable to cope with the language demands of the French Staff College course in France. I had been assumed command of the Directorate of Military Intelligence in the Army and on request was dispatched to the USA on a few days secondment to build a professional bridge between my office and the equivalent US Army intelligence staff. A similar arrangement was made with the military intelligence establishment in the British Army. I further took the opportunity to acquire material for propounding a doctrine for Nigerian Army Psychological Operations. I returned to Nigeria to find the post of Director occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Halilu Akilu without notice, about the end of January, 1983. The clique that was now in control of the Army, and later the nation, was to exhibit lawlessness in years to come, into 1999. I had become redundant, without an office, and without a posting, I was just casually supplanted by Lieutenant Colonel Akilu and no explanation was necessary, and none was asked for. Halilu Akilu was high up in Major General Ibrahim Babangida's political military equation and also served fittingly as an insertion (a kind of fifth column) in the spine of the Buhari/ldiagbon two-some, as time will tell".

"Shortly before the coup d'etat that brought in &e regime of Major General Buhari, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon was the Military Secretary at Army Headquarters. It was to him I reported with a view to asking for further deployment. He seemed genuinely surprised that I was floating and I was also surprised that he was taken aback. In his characteristic sharp retort, he said, "come with me to Supreme Headquarters,' just as I was squeezed out of the DMI. It was not clear to me whether he was giving an advice, an order or a directive but when he added further that I should report for duty immediately, the situation was clear. My posting was later regularized and I was providentially relieved from the cloak and dagger intrigues and manoeuvring that dogged my posting to the DMI. It is a pity that Tunde Idiagbon's regime was destined to collapse, in spite of all its patriotic zeal and vigour, in words and actions".

Working with Tunde Idiagbon

"Major General Ibrahim Babangida and his clique overthrew the Buhari/Idiagbon duo in August 1985. It was a great experience to work in the shadows of Major General Muhammadu Buhari, the Head of State and Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon who was Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters. Both were men of tensile steel coiled into spring, taciturn but clearly articulate, austere and above all else, decisive except on one count that cost them their positions. I shall come to this later. I had limited contact with Major General Buhari, although I travelled a number of times in the teams accompanying his visits to states and formations. On one occasion, I took the minutes of his dialogue with senior officers at which his frankness and sincerity shone. It was at one of these dialogues that he took a swipe at the concept of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans for Nigeria. He had wondered why one should bear a large debt burden that he appears unable to redress and yet wishes to ask for more loans or preach debt forgiveness. He believed that Nigeria was capable of meeting its debt obligations and was willing to do so. I was also in his entourage to the Republic of the Gambia during that country's Independence Anniversary celebration in 1985. From a distance, I observed that he was intensely contemplative, patriotic and of a very exemplary bearing, a practical leader you would willingly follow to war. Between himself and his Chief of Staff, there was a matching rapport and they were constantly in consultation and communication and sat atop a collective decision-making military administration."

"During the Republic of Chad Operation when he was General Officer Commanding the 3 Armoured Division in Jos, Brigadier Buhari's men had captured some territory in successive actions. But in a characteristic Nigerian fervour, he was ordered to withdraw to the Nigerian border, after the attendant loss of life and equipment. It was reported that he regarded this as a betrayal of the men who gave their lives in the battles and insisted that we should hold on to our positions until all issues at stake were conclusively resolved. Not to be part of the withdrawal, he opted for his due leave and the concessionary withdrawal was carried out in his absence. Since 1985 border clashes and incursions have continued to irritate and offend military sensibilities between the two countries. Indeed, other prickly neighbours may have learnt some lessons on Nigeria's conciliatory resolve on such matters. Major General Muharnmadu Buhari was easily approachable despite his stern and drawn appearance though I never had the temerity to ask him what he really sought about the nation he ruled and his perceived role in it."

"Amongst his legacies, is the cleansing tonic he brought to bear on the moral health, core, ageless values and discipline in a disorderly Nigerian terrain and body politic. His administration remains an opportunity lost. The irrepressible Nigerian press was wary of the stringent Decree 2 that lent greater risk to their freedom to publish and be damned. The general atmosphere seemed austere and Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon who was responsible for bi-weekly briefings to the press and the nation did not think that his job was a laughing matter. I recall that sometime into the administration, I had needled him by reporting that his very stoic bearing and austere mien was disconcerting to the public. Nigerians looked for some smile on his face. I was amazed by his response, he gave me the benefit of a wry smile and retorted, not yet, there is noting to laugh about now' and broke into a broad' brief smile. He was obviously consumed, like his boss, by their commitment to altering the moral tone of the nation without which, as a foundation, all efforts may come to naught. Whether history has vindicated them or not is a matter for individual conjecture, but events in Nigeria a decade later point to their foresight and objectivity and reflect their sense of mission for which the nation must give them due credit. Obviously, between 1985-97, the nation has had enough to laugh about. But neither General Buhari, nor General Tunde Idiagbon can afford to laugh now in 2000, alive or dead."

"On the other side of the fence stood the great tactician, ebullient, charismatic, affable, friendly and immensely generous with government resources, extrovert and almost egalitarian, Major General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, a soldier-politician and the Chief of Army Staff. There was a seething rivalry of some sort or ubiquitous cat and mouse game behind the scenes and between the four-some of Major General Ibrahim Babangida/Brigadier Sani Abacha on the one hand, and Major Generals Muhammadu Buhari/Tunde Idiagbon on the other. A Commission of Inquiry had been instituted into the Ministry of Defence contracts, accounts, etc. The air was rife with speculations that things were not too chummy between the two contending sides, and as usual, the smell of a coup d'etat hung thick in the air. On one occasion, I approached General Idiagbon in his office to warn on the rumours of a possible coup d'etat in the making. I was not in a position to say with all clarity and certainty where the smell was coming from. One of the basic rules of the intelligence game is never ignore or dismiss information especially, if they do not conform to your expectations. General Idiagbon shrugged his shoulder and retorted, 'let them try' in his usual monosyllables and made no more comments. For two reasons I was relieved; first, he did not insist that I should disclose the source of my information. I had no such source. Second, he seemed to be already aware of the danger and was doing something about it hence his appearance of confidence and imperturbability."

"On another occasion, a mutual friend had approached me and warned about an impending coup d'etat obviously masterminded by the Chief of Army Staff. Rather than convey the message to the Chief of Staff by myself, I advised other mutual friend to confront the Chief of Staff with his information. We both did at my instance. Not long after, Major General Babangida and his men struck in August 1985. The Chief of Staff was outside the country while on pilgrimage to Mecca and the Head of State was taken unawares. Perhaps, the duo were helpless in the wake of Nigeria's master coup planners bringing to bear their consummate skills, guile and conspiracy. The 3rd Armoured Division, which General Buhari earlier commanded, was far away in the Northern plateau of Jos, while Brigadier Idiagbon had only just vacated a staff position. Most of the men who brought them to power had switched their loyalty, obviously, in conformity with the ultimate grand designs of General Ibrahim Babangida. That is, to assume the high office of the President and Commander in Chief himself. General Buhari's regime was therefore a stopgap in that grand design. Between the planners, they also had the support of 2 Infantry Division stationed at Ibadan under Brigadier General Sani Abacha. Colonel Halilu Akilu was DMI Lieutenant Colonel John Shagaya had control of the Presidential Guard which would quickly neutralize any untoward reaction from the Lagos Garrison."

"Major General Ibrahim Babangida sat atop the strategic office of Chief of Army Staff. This conspiratorial group and their cohorts properly circumscribed General Buhari and Major General Idiagbon. Most transitional coups in Nigeria have revolved around the following; late, Brigadier General Ibrahim Bako, a brilliant Armoured Corps officer who died in unexplained circumstances in the 1983 coup d'etat that sent President Shehu Shagari packing. others were, General Murtala Mohammed, Major General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, an accomplished strategist of vast resources and the hero of the Onitsha campaign, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida and General Sani Abacha. These were the carpetbaggers, the first tier of coup merchants. The second was forming around the officers of Nigeria Defence Academy Course Three and by 1985 they were mostly lieutenant colonels. A new crop of officers were further tacitly being groomed into this brand of schemers, the third tier which formed around General Babangida and had such young officers such as Lawan Gwadabe, Ibrahim Dasuki, John (Yohana) Madaki, to name a few. So, there were first and second lines with the third in a state of gestation, all aimed at ensuring the sustenance of the status quo and power equation in the nation. Each would protect the previous from its horrid shadows while in power. They were all northern in their political orientations and composition".

"I was Deputy Director Joint Services at Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Sunny Adenibun was the Director. He was directly responsible to the Chief of Staff (SHQ) but could on occasions have access to the Head of State if he was not overawed by the former's insistence on a strict channel of communication. The Chief of Staff had painstakingly established a compact team and an effective regimen for dealing with the day to day needs of his office and flow of information to the Head of State and Commander in Chief outside strictly ministerial and state government channels. Everyone worked late into the night and the government had rhythm and predictability. On the morning of August 27, 1985, the cold morning air seemed normal for a seasonal dry August break. But instead of the early morning rendition of music and news, it was clear that soldiers were on the march again. This time, against themselves in what has been branded a 'palace coup' rather than one against civilian authority. This time though, they failed to tell the population whether the toppled regime of their colleague-in-arms was corrupt or not. I dressed quickly at my No I Club Road residence Ikoyi, Lagos, and at about 0800 hours, against family advice drove first to Dodan Barracks and then to Bonny Camp at Victoria Island. Here, regular troops were stationed. I had responded in the same way when Colonel Dimka struck in 1976 while I was General Staff officer at Army Headquarters. Under these situations, you are expected to report to the nearest military unit and await further orders, hoping, as it were, that any forthcoming order would not mean the end of you. With coup d' etat you could never tell."

"At Bonny Camp, everywhere seemed subdued with troops on standby. At the guest house usually meant for visiting officers to Lagos, my presence was announced. I was admitted to the main hall from which communication between the coup planners and the collaborators was being consolidated. I had foot driven to Dodan Barracks, the seat of government first chosen by General Yakubu Gowon as the nation's presidency. The Head of State was neither here nor at the Bonny Camp which implied that he had either escaped arrest or was under arrest. When I asked for his whereabouts, I was told that he was being held at the Camp. The irony is that, as the nation went through this sudden and reverberating change, the coup-makers were popping champagne for breakfast and celebrating their victory. Champagne can be sharp or sour or tingling or refreshing. Different occasions add varying strokes to the taste. That morning, the champagne was sharp. I had taken in the participants at a glance and as arrangements were afoot to fly in the new Head of State, I took leave of the group as an era came to a bewildering close. A new era of gap-toothed smile had begun. Any doubts regarding the rationality for the change or palace coup were dissipated from public consciousness as the nation reverted to business as usual. This time around, Nigerians were to be engaged and consumed by a new macabre 'maradonic' dance crafted by the master himself and labelled by the expansive and indefatigable statesman, General Olusegun Obasanjo, as "the more you look, the less you see."

Changing the colour of the Naira

"Early in 1984, the government and its monetary authorities were alarmed by the distortions in the nation's monetary activities. Worrisome to federal authorities were the level of inflation, lack of correct tab on the volume of currency in circulation within the economy. The role of the naira in money laundering (the drug trade was just gathering momentum), illegal trade in the naira within the region and rising stock of corrupt wealth stashed away outside the country added to these concerns. I was called into the office of the Chief of Staff Major General Tunde Idiagbon and directed to take notes on an operational order for the withdrawal of, and change of the coloration of Nigerian currencies. The orders were issued directly to me outside the regular channel of communication, that is, side-tracking my immediate boss, the Director of Joint Services. A superior commander can often, for various reasons he may wish not to explain, set aside these niceties to meet prevailing exigencies of his needs. I was warned in no uncertain terms that outside the Head of State and the Chief of Staff no one else at that stage, was privy to government strategies and plan, not even the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. I was very comfortable with the grave secrecy implied, but not quite at ease on how to deal with my boss. In the end, good sense and pragmatism prevailed. Until the plan was completed and released and the full implementation put in rapid gear, I remained as mum as a dead cat, any conceivable leak could have cost me immeasurable personal grief and agony. Particularly, I believed and still do that the actions of the duo were instructed by serious considerations of grave national interests and survival.

"The initial orders were issued over two hours and within forty-eight hours, I had the first draft ready for review. In the end, the plan was complete in about six days. Largely because of the necessary research that was required for such a major plan covering the entire nation, planning time had to be kept short to prevent inadvertent leakage. Throughout, I used just one clerk, Sergeant Ibrahim Audu, for the entire clerical work. He was a most able supporting staff. I was amazed by the Chief of Staff's grasp of the attendant problems, his anticipation of possible critical areas, knowledge of the geography of Nigeria, knack for details and concept of operations. In the end, he put a masterly plan in place that the government and its agencies implemented with clinical and warlike precision and effectiveness. Before then, and in an uncanny display of foresight and vision, they had put in place a preliminary operation code-named, War Against Indiscipline, the battle-cry for orderliness in public behaviour, civility, work ethics, environmental hygiene and the moral health of the nation in all its ramifications. The conduct of the currency withdrawal and exchange operations therefore, dovetailed rather smoothly into the emerging climate of order and orderliness in the polity."