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On Spanish-Moroccan Territorial Dispute By Bola A. Akinterinwa
Last week witnessed the aggravation of the territorial dispute between Spain, a former and powerful European colonial power, and Morocco, a Maghrebin African country.
On Thursday night, 11th July, 2002 some Moroccan soldiers occupied the Isla del Perejil, hoisted the Moroccan flag there, and renamed the islet, Leila, which many people in Europe also refer to as 'Parsley Island'. The following day, 12th July, Madrid sent gunboats to the area to protect the territory and in anticipation of a possible military confrontation. Will there be a new war? If yes, what are the likely scenarios? We believe that the likelihood of the dispute degenerating to shooting war, is remote but it cannot be totally ruled out. The dispute is an expression of the worsening relationship between Spain and Morocco but it is yet to reach its lowest ebb. The dispute is over who has sovereignty over the Isla del Perejil. The manifestation and context of the claims of the two countries raise the extent to which colonial legacy can be tolerated in the 215' century and thereafter, especially in the light of the principle of sanctity of colonial frontiers, religiously upheld by the OAU and its successor, the AU. In this regard, Spain took official possession of the disputed island in 1808, even though she had, before then, been considering the island as part of her territories. Morocco considers that Isla del Perejil was not mentioned in the 1912 Treaty that gave the enclaves of Ceuta and Melila to Spain. Even if the Treaty had done so, Morocco believes that Spanish sovereignty came to an end with the signing of their 1956 treaty, and therefore considers that the two enclaves are located within its international boundaries. The Moroccan occupation of the Perejil also raises the many contradictions in Morocco-Spanish ties. More than 200,000 Moroccans live legally in Spain. What will happen to then in the event of military hostilities? Morocco is the biggest recipient of Spanish foreign aid and Spain is also the second biggest trading partner of Morocco. Will this situation not be adversely affected? The crisis raises the issue of how two kings relate with one another in modern times. Spain and Morocco are ruled by royal majesties. Morocco occupation of the Perejil coincided with the 3-day celebration of King Mohamed VI's marriage. It occurred only two days after the new Spanish foreign Minister, Mr. Ana Palacio, assumed office, hence, compelling him to begin with a special headache. Spain presents the object of dispute as having no significant strategic value but still wants to keep it as her territory. True enough, Perejil is not inhabited by human beings. The island only covers 7 acres and lies 6 miles off Ceuta and 200 metres from the coast of Northern Morocco. The circumference of the island is less than half-mile. However, the island, in the eyes of Spain, is being used for many activities that are directly inimical to the interest of Spain: drug peddling, illegal fishing, take off points for illegal immigrants, territorial incursions, etc. The interesting point is that Morocco also says that her occupation of Perejil is to simply set an observation post to fight terrorism and illegal immigration into Europe across the 12-mile strait of Gibraltar, which not only divides Spain from Africa but also separates the Mediterranean from the Atlantic. More importantly, the King of Morocco is generally believed to be a good ally of the West. However, he has ignored this factor in deciding the occupation of Perejil. The King may not be blamed for some reasons. The Spaniards do support the POLISARIO Front Independence Movement in the Western Sahara against which the Rabat government has been fighting. In October 2001, Rabat had to withdraw its ambassador from Madrid. In fact, earlier this month, the Spanish ambassador in Rabat was summoned to explain Spain's deployment of five warships near (600 metres) the Mediterranean port of AC Hoceima. Although the Spanish government said the gunboats were "on exercise", Morocco was not satisfied. It is understandable if the King of Spain, therefore, refused to attend the marriage of his Moroccan counterpart, especially if the latter is claiming that the disputed "island is within Moroccan territorial waters". In this regard, the EU presidency supports Spain and has asked Morocco to "immediately withdraw its forces" from the island. Morocco's foreign minister, Mr. Mohamed Benaisa, said the Spanish response was out of proportion and has expressed the preparedness of Rabat authorities to resolve the crisis through dialogue but without withdrawing Moroccan troops from the island. Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, also said that Moroccan invasion of the island would not be tolerated. Thus, a war may be in the preparation. How can Africa prevent the Moroccan order and the Spanish counter order from resulting into an encounter and disorder? First, any war between Spain and Morocco has the potential of quickly becoming internationalised and dangerously unequal. Already, the European Union has indicated its unreserved support for Spain. We are therefore talking about 15 countries against Morocco. Besides, there is the unwritten new rule in international politics according to which the major power brokers flock together to deal with any 'threat to their common interests.' Even when such interests are not at all common, the European powers have also been operating on the basis of solidarity. Put differently, Spain will not only have the support of the other 14 countries of the EU but also that of the other major powers, especially the United States and Japan. As regards support for Morocco, it will be, at best, little. The whole of Africa is militarily weak. It is already conflict ridden. In the event of a Moroccan-Spanish war, it will be one war too many for the African people. The resources are just not there. Such a war will directly negate the spirit of the NEPAD and the new African Union, both of which are seeking a peaceable and secure environment for economic development. The role of Morocco in African politics, especially since the 1970s, has not been encouraging. Morocco has adopted an open chair policy in the OAU. Like the other Maghrebin countries (Tunisia and Algeria), Morocco has been playing double cards at convenience: the African and Arab cards respectively. Morocco is an African country when it is convenient and an Arab country when it is not. As a result, Morocco cannot really rely on the unconditional support of the whole of Africa. Without doubt, a country like Libya may be eager to lend support to Morocco for some reasons: Libya's Ghadafi has expansionist tendencies. Libya's dispute with Chad on the sovereignty of Aouzou strip is a reminder. The objectives of Islamization are also possible dynamics. The factor can engender the support of some Muslim countries such as Mali and Mauritania. Such a support will be moral rather than concrete. In the context of Arab countries in the Middle East, the support cannot be seriously relied on. Many, if not all, of the Western countries wield a considerable influence on the Middle East. There will be need to weigh the gains of having to support Morocco against the West, especially the extent of religious factors. Even at the level of sub-Saharan Africa, it will be difficult to imagine how Mali, Mauritania, Senegal etc., for instance, will support Morocco against a would-be French-backed Spanish troops. Will China and Russia support Morocco? Morocco has two main problems: she behaves like a European country but the EU does not want to accept such attitudinal behaviour and Morocco also behaves like an Arab country in Africa, rather than a real African country. So, she is neither here nor there. Secondly, any Moroccan-Spanish military hostility will provide a new platform for the testing of new weapons in Africa, on the one hand, and a special opportunity to extend the war to the borders of Iraq, on the other. The wave of terrorism cannot but also sharply increase, especially at the level of European missions. The nature of the dispute will change from being territorial to religious. The vertical relationship between the North and South will cease to be cordial and is likely to be characterised by deeper suspicion. In the eyes of many learned observers, the current globalization, the new "right to protect" of the United Nations, the international alliance of the developed countries against perceived threats to their common interests etc. are complementary manifestations of re-colonization in different forms. Any Moroccan-Spanish war will be seen as an opportunity to further weaken Africa through Morocco. Consequently, Africa must promptly mediate the crisis. Nigeria can assist in this case. Although the attitude of Morocco to the OAU is nothing to write home about, African solidarity, which is emphasised by the AU, requires that Morocco be supported. Besides, it is illogical for Spain to have sovereignty over an islet that is geographically located within the territorial waters of Morocco. More important, Morocco should consider what is at stake for its cities before engaging in a war it is not likely to win. |
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